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MERLEAU-PONTY ANd NISHIdA: “INTERExPRESSION” 
AS MOTOR-PERcEPTUAL FAITH
Adam Loughnane
department of Philosophy, University college cork
adam.loughnane@ucc.ie
Both Nishida Kitarō and Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote extensively about artistic ex-
pression in their early works, yet in the last period of their careers that consideration 
is put mostly aside as they engage more directly with abstract ontological concerns. 
As this happens, a curiously overlooked concept becomes prominent in their writ-
ings, namely “faith.” While Merleau-Ponty’s is a “perceptual faith” (foi perceptive), 
and Nishida’s is, broadly speaking, a religious faith (shinnen 信念), neither is strictly 
secular nor spiritual, yet both entail a remarkably similar ontology of the motor- 
perceptual body. Unfortunately, their lives ended before they could fully develop 
these philosophically problematic concepts. This is especially unfortunate because, 
as I argue, faith is one under-explored interpretive key that can help us understand 
not just the late period but also the entirety of their philosophic projects.1 The present 
study therefore seeks to expand their notions of faith, not by imagining how it might 
have evolved had they further developed the concept, but by going back to their 
early writings, showing how their understanding of artistic expression actually prefig-
ures their later concepts of faith. I argue that in their philosophies, the practice of 
artistic expression is a practice of faith — not faith in a transcendent being, scripture, 
or event, but faith as a motor-perceptual body woven into a motor-perceptual world. 
To explore this possibility within and between their writings, I frame their under-
standings of expression as “motor-perceptual faith,” which serves as a provisional 
device for placing the two in dialogue, for finding new conceptual continuities be-
tween their early and late writings, and for challenging strict boundaries between art, 
religion, and philosophy East and West.
This discussion explores Nishida’s and Merleau-Ponty’s works in tandem and 
focuses on one of the most distinctive aspects of their understandings of expres-
sion and faith, which is how they go beyond a “positivist” account of the moving 
perceiving body. Since both philosophers construe motion and perception not 
as two separate actions but as one corporeal phenomenon, that event can be 
 referred to as “motor-perception.”2 What is unique about their models of motor- 
perception — and what will constitute the heart of this analysis — is their inclusion 
of negation in their accounts of motion and perception. For both philosophers, to 
express oneself is to negate while being negated by the motor-perceptual world. 
In the first section I  discuss negation on the perceptual level, followed by consider-
ing negation on the motor-perceptual level in the second section. This will provide 
the framework for seeing how negation factors into both philosophers’ accounts of 
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 artistic expression, and ultimately for construing expression as a practice of motor- 
perceptual faith.
I. Perceptual Negation: Multi-Perspectivalism
Many of our taken-for-granted ideas, as well as some of the most sophisticated phil-
osophical and scientific frameworks for understanding perception, are positivist in 
orientation. They are positivist in that they do not consider negativity, absence, or 
invisibility as constitutive aspects of perception, and therefore ignore the ways 
the negative is bound up with and complexifies positivity, presence, and visibility. 
confined by this assumption, the visible is thought to be constituted solely by what 
is present to perception, by sensory data that hits the visual apparatus. What is 
 invisible, absent, or unseen is thought to be secondary, non-essential or non-visual, 
or is simply ignored. In such a framework, vision is understood to be strictly uni- 
perspectival, while memories, projections, or imaginings that impinge upon vision 
are related to but not considered part of the visible itself.
Positivist assumptions tend to enforce a whole set of binaries, the most promi-
nent being the distinction between the perceiving subject and perceived object. With 
this assumption as the starting point for theorizing about perception, one must then 
concoct an explanation for how these metaphysically discontinuous entities can 
 encounter one another. Following from this basic dualism is a further set of binaries 
between mind and matter, proximity and distance, activity and passivity, vision and 
touch. Binaries such as these impede a full understanding of perception because 
philosophies built thereupon remain confined by various conceptual instantiations of 
the identity-difference binary. Yet, neither identity nor difference can explain percep-
tion: if vision were absolutely different and discontinuous from what is seen, it would 
replace the object when it occurs. conversely, if vision were completely continuous 
and identical with that which it sees, there would cease to be a relation between two 
things, and therefore no perception. As Nishida writes, “If seeing and the seen are 
merely one, there is no intuition.”3 For perception to obtain, the perceiving subject 
must be partly identical to the perceived object, yet at the same time must have an 
aspect that remains distinct. Human perception is an event between identity and 
difference. The perceiving subject must be partly continuous with the seen object, 
while remaining partly discontinuous. Nishida’s term “continuity of discontinuity” 
(hirenzoku no renzoku 非連続の連続)4 points to this ambiguity, while in Merleau- 
Ponty’s philosophy a similar ontological inclination is expressed as “chiasm” (chiasme) 
and “intertwining” (entrelacs).5
Because the body is related to the world in a chiasmatic continuous discontinu-
ity, it is possible to look at body-world relations and notice difference, while from 
another perspective seeing identity. Neither Nishida nor Merleau-Ponty seeks to 
 reduce this ambiguity to monist or dualist metaphysics. Their philosophies and 
their accounts of artistic expression are premised on sustaining this ambiguity. 
 Moving to the next section I will discuss how ambiguity is explained in their 
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 philosophies as a mutual form of negation, and how this points beyond positivism, 
beyond the representational model of perception, and beyond its uni-perspectival 
assumptions.
Mutual Self-Negation: Sartre’s Nullité Absolue and Nishida’s Zettai Hitei
To explain negation and how it relates to perception, we can begin with a very sim-
ple example of any everyday object that contains things. With a jug, for example, just 
as it has negative space to hold water or wine, likewise human perception requires 
negativity to allow perceptions to enter consciousness. If this were not the case, 
and visual data were transformed completely into the self when it reaches the 
eyes, there would be no perception. Something of the object must remain while 
that object is being perceived. What does remain is not of the self: it is non-self. Yet, 
insofar as an aspect of perceptual non-self is in the body of the self, it is a negation of 
the body. Perception is an event between self and non-self, between positivity and 
negativity.
To perceive, the self must be negated. To perceive is to be a perceptual non-
self — yet not a complete non-self. Merleau-Ponty’s discussion of negation in The 
Visible and the Invisible (Le visible et l’invisible) (1964) centers primarily on a cri-
tique of Sartre’s notion of “absolute nothingness” (nullité absolue). Although Sartre 
seeks to counter the positivist framework for perception, he goes too far to the 
 opposite extreme, understanding perception as requiring not a partial but a complete 
negation of the perceiving subject. For Merleau-Ponty, the unacceptable implication 
of absolute negation is that if the perceiving subject were pure nothingness, then 
the perceptual object would have to be absolute being and positivity. In his own 
words, “from the moment that I conceive of myself as negativity and the world as 
positivity, there is no longer any interaction.”6 For Merleau-Ponty, Sartre’s absolute 
negation is another form of positivist philosophy disguised as a negativist philoso-
phy.7 contrarily, he asserts that if I perceive “then I am no longer the pure negative.” 
He continues:
[T]o see is no longer simply to nihilate, the relation between what I see and I who see is 
not one of immediate or frontal contradiction; the things attract my look, my gaze  caresses 
the things, it espouses their contours and their reliefs, between it and them we catch sight 
of a complicity. As for being, I can no longer define it as a hard core of positivity under 
the negative properties that would come to it from my vision.8
Just as a positive subject cannot encounter a positive object, on the other 
 extreme a fully negated subject cannot encounter a purely positive object. “The 
 absolute positing of a single object,” Merleau-Ponty writes, would be “the death of 
consciousness.”9 Nishida speaks of the same “death” in his Fundamental Problems 
(Tetsugaku no konpon mondai) (1933) when he writes:
Negation as self-negation, i.e., absolute negation, would be a self-death. The self would 
ultimately be nothing. There is no meaning to such an inclusion of absolute negation 
within the self. . . . For in order for there to be the mutual determination of individuals, the 
external must be internal and the internal must be external.10
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To avoid the inversion of positivism, the perceiving subject and the perceptual object 
must both be constituted by positivity and negativity. Translators Krummel and Naga-
tomo refer to Nishida’s idea of negation as “mutual negation.”11 The body is able to 
encounter the world not simply because the self negates while the world remains 
posited, but because of a two-way mutual negation. There is neither simple negation 
nor affirmation, but, as Krummel and Nagatomo argue, “each negates the other for 
the sake of self-affirmation.”12 It is only on this basis that bodies can encounter one 
another. “What makes these various inter-determinations possible,” write Krummel 
and Nagatomo, “is mutual self-negation.”13 This self-negation is mutual insofar as it 
obtains on both sides of the perceptual encounter. The decisive point for Nishida is 
that affirmation and negation are not mutually exclusive ontological principles. 
One of the most definitive aspects of Nishida’s late ontology is his principle of 
 “affirmation of absolute negation” (zettai hitei no kōtei 絶対否定の肯定), which, like 
Merleau-Ponty’s refutation of Sartre’s absolute negation, clearly precludes a one- 
sided negation. One cannot affirm oneself counter to or in the absence of another or 
the world without at the same time being negated by the other and the world.
As Nishida’s translators allude, this structure of affirmation and negation is simi-
lar in Nishida’s and Merleau-Ponty’s terminology:
We find that this dialectic [of self-negation] involves a chiasma of vertical and horizontal 
interrelations manifest in various types of relations — such as individual-environment, 
 person-person, subject-object, etc.14
Through mutual negation the absolute distinction between perceiving subject and 
perceived object is replaced by a partial non-subject and non-object. Thus, en counter 
is possible when, as Nishida writes, “in expression, the objective is the subjective, or 
rather subjectivity can be seen in the very depth of the objective. . . . [I]t has the 
meaning of determining and negating the person.” And foreshadowing our later 
 discussion, he claims that “this is especially so in aesthetic creation.”15
Negation: From Non-Subject to Non-Object
Accepting that the self must be a perceptual non-self in order to encounter the world 
is not an entirely difficult proposition to accept, yet the implication that is perhaps 
more problematic — at least throughout the history of Western philosophy — is that 
the object itself must also be constituted by negativity. Not only must the self be 
 partly non-self, but the object must likewise be non-object. certainly, it is not difficult 
to find the Eastern precursors to Nishida’s attempt to go beyond objecthood, but 
one might think that the non-object is neither part of Merleau-Ponty’s tradition nor 
his own thinking. However, in his essay “Eye and Mind” (“L’oeil et l’esprit”) (1961) 
and in later works, he pushes beyond positivist conceptions of objecthood. He 
writes: “a certain hollow opened up within the [object] in-itself, a certain constitutive 
emptiness — an emptiness which . . . sustains the supposed positivity of things.”16 
Soon after, in The Visible and the Invisible, he similarly claims that “one sole condi-
tion is laid down for [the other] coming on the scene: that they could present them-
selves to me as other focuses of negativity.”17
714 Philosophy East & West
When considering negativity regarding objects, one must not go too far, as Sartre 
did, and absolutize it. This would simply be to reinforce the positive-negative binary 
from the other way around, rather than ambiguating the distinction. Just as an abso-
lute subject and object cannot encounter one another, neither can a completely ne-
gated non-subject and non-object. Merleau-Ponty is sensitive to this issue and brings 
negativity into his account of perception without erasing all aspects of positivity:
In reality, this glass, this table, this room can be sensibly present to me only if nothing 
separates me from them, only if I am in them and not in myself, in my representations or 
my thoughts, only if I am nothing. Yet (one will say) inasmuch as I have this before myself 
I am not an absolute nothing, I am a determined nothing: not this glass, nor this table, nor 
this room; my emptiness is not indefinite, and to this extent at least my nothingness is 
filled or nullified.18
Similarly, Nishida suggests that the negated object has a place for the perceiver: 
“[T]o view a thing artistically,” he maintains, “must mean to submerge the self within 
the thing in itself. In abandoning the self, one conforms to the objective itself.”19 To 
perceive is therefore not simply for a subject to receive sense data from a positive 
object: the object itself must have negativity in order to render itself as a perceptual 
object. It is not only that I make space for the object to inhabit; there is a place, a 
“depth” in the object itself, which my perceptual body-mind inhabits.
Multi-Perspectivalism: “depth” and Internal-External Perception
When the positive and negative aspects of perception are taken into account, 
we go beyond a uni-perspectival framework toward a multi-perspectival form of 
 vision. As such, the absent and the invisible are included as constitutive aspects of 
the visible. Just as the visible has a “lining” (doublure) 20 of invisibility, according to 
Merleau- Ponty, similarly with Nishida the present is always constituted by the non- 
present. As Nishida writes, “if we consider that our consciousness is determined in 
the  present, then there is no way of knowing about non-present things. However, 
we  cannot deny that we clearly possess consciousness of the non-present.”21 To 
 notice the multi-perspectival aspects of vision, we must follow Nishida’s and 
 Merleau-Ponty’s endeavor to go beyond a simple dichotomy of the present and 
non-present.
Turning to Merleau-Ponty, one of his key insights about perception is that vision 
is always constituted by the presence of other vantage points. “The others’ gaze on 
the things is a second openness,”22 he writes. The “certitude of the perceptual faith” 
he claims, is “having access to the very world the others perceive.”23 We have access 
to the others’ perspectives through the world, which are not positively present. They 
are present in the form of non-presence. In its absence, the non-present impinges 
upon the visible yet remains invisible. This ambiguity results in multi-perspectivalism 
not only among humans but also between the vantage points of humans and ob-
jects in the visual field. Because “things and my body are made of the same stuff,” 
Merleau-Ponty claims that vision does not just come about in me, but “vision must 
somehow come about in them.”24 This is an almost inconceivable proposition if 
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one remains within a positivist framework and its overdetermined presence-non- 
presence binary. However, when negative aspects of perception are included, when 
the invisibility lining the visible is recognized, we can see objects as much more than 
passive receivers of uni-perspectival human vision.
Seeing-Seen
The way we see ourselves, objects, or the world is infused with the invisible and the 
representationally absent. We see other bodies and our own differently depending on 
who is looking at us. What we know, imagine, or remember about others can deter-
mine our experience of them more than the sensory data hitting our retinas. One of 
Merleau-Ponty’s most important insights regarding vision is that seeing is never sim-
ply seeing, but always seeing-seen.25 The being-seen aspect of our vision is invisible 
to us, yet it counts in our visual experience. We do not see what others see as though 
we had a video feed from their perceptual apparatus that added a second visual 
stream to our own. The other’s vision has its own positivity, which we do not have 
access to, yet their vision is experienced within our own as non-present though 
 constitutive. The invisible is not transformed into the visible; there is a “lining” of 
invisibility within the visible. Insofar as both positive and negative aspects deter-
mine perceptual experience, that experience expands from uni-perspectival to 
 multiple-perspectival perception. This is possible because, as Nishida writes, “our 
own body is seen from the outside . . . [,] but besides being something to be seen, it 
is that which sees at the same time.”26
Both Merleau-Ponty and Nishida explain how these multi-perspectival aspects 
are constitutive of all visual experience, even of vision of non-human entities, which 
fall under visibility in the broader sense. When we look at an object from a frontal 
vantage point our perception of the object is affected by dimensions that are not 
positively visible. When looking at a cube, we only receive positive visual data from 
at most three external sides, yet in their absence the other three sides as well as the 
internal dimension of the object are included in the frontal view. We know this, for 
example, from our experience seeing a building façade. We would not be surprised 
at the moment we find out that it is not a real building if our vision was not already 
determined by the expectation of features that turn out to be absent. The mistaken 
assumptions we have about objects such as a façade show us that vision is already 
reaching inside and around perceived objects, and being determined by expectations 
regarding features that are absent or hidden. Nishida says that we are conscious of 
(ishiki shiteiru 意識している) the absent things though they are not present to the 
senses.
A positivist approach misses multi-perspectival aspects of perception because it 
maintains an internal-external dichotomy. contrary to this, Nishida argues in many 
places that “[t]here is no internal perception apart from external perception.” “[T]he 
world of perception,” he writes, “exists as internal-qua-external perception and vice 
versa.”27 Nishida further contends that “when we see the exterior of a box it cannot 
be said that its interior is not directly an object of consciousness. Nor can it be said 
that in the present the facts of the past are not present in consciousness.”28 Similarly, 
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according to Merleau-Ponty, I do not see things only from an external viewpoint, nor 
do I “see [the object] according to its exterior envelope; I live it from the inside; I am 
immersed in it. After all, the world is around me, not in front of me.”29 In his earlier 
work Phenomenology of Perception he wrote:
The object is seen at all times as it is seen from all directions and by the same means, 
namely the structure imposed by a horizon. The present still holds on to the immediate 
past without positing it as an object, and since the immediate past similarly holds its 
 immediate predecessor, past time is wholly collected up and grasped in the present.30
To the extent that our perception is constituted by the non-present vantage point of 
unseen dimensions such as the inside or backside of an object, vision is more than 
uni-perspectival. If one only considered the positive aspects, vision would seem 
uni-perspectival, but such a limited view ignores the way that vision is augmented by 
the absent, invisible points of view. A dispersal of vantage points is possible because 
objects have what Merleau-Ponty calls “depth” (profondeur), which allows them to 
be experienced as having a negativity through which one sees the world from many 
points of view. In Merleau-Ponty’s words:
What I call depth is either nothing, or else it is my participation in a Being without restric-
tion, first and foremost a participation in the being of space beyond every particular point 
of view. Things encroach upon one another because they are outside one another.31
Merleau-Ponty believes artists have the ability to instantiate this depth in their 
paintings. Artists do not simply depict what they see, but paint by “adding to what 
they could see of things at that moment, what things could see of them.”32 These 
 visual experiences “attest to their being a total or absolute vision, leaving nothing 
outside, including themselves.”33 If we take seriously the account of vision given by 
Nishida and Merleau-Ponty, then many of what could be too easily disregarded as 
“poetic” or “suggestive” passages in their writings can be reconsidered as put forth 
in a language appropriate to the ambiguous nature of perception. For example, 
 Merleau-Ponty writes, “the landscape thinks itself in me,”34 and, quoting André 
Marchand, he writes that it felt “as though the trees were looking back at me.”35 
Nishida says more simply that the “mountains and rivers must also be expressive.”36 
These remarks will be misread if one remains confined to a positivist understanding 
of perception. I suggest that when considering the perceptually negative, these phi-
losophers are describing visual experience in a world with perceptual depth, where 
perception is inherently ambiguous regarding internal and external presentation.
There are remarkable similarities between how Nishida and Merleau-Ponty ar-
rive at their accounts of multi-perspectival vision, especially as they approach their 
later writings. However, a point of disagreement emerges between the two as well. 
Both philosophers attempt to conceive of perception beyond the subject-object 
 binary, yet it appears that Nishida goes farther in terms of proposing a fully de- 
localized and de-subjectivized form of vision with his concept of “seeing without a 
seer” (mirumono nakushite miru koto 見るものなくして見ること).37 According to 
this concept, vision still arises as an event, yet there is no localizable subject or 
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 object of vision. Nishida goes completely beyond the subject-object distinction 
 toward a type of vision he later describes as the “self-seeing” of the world, and of 
Basho (場所). Referring to this “self-seeing,” Krummel and Nagatomo explain that 
“[h]ere the meaning of ‘seeing’ extends beyond merely humans to encompass life or 
world in general.”38
In his last work, where Merleau-Ponty develops his ontology of “Flesh” (chair), 
he explores a type of vision that exceeds the human body and arises as an event in a 
much broader perceptual fabric. Like Nishida, Merleau-Ponty is not speaking of 
 vision as a strictly human faculty. He speaks of “a vision that we do not make but is 
made in us,” writes Lawlor.39 Unlike Nishida, however, Merleau-Ponty maintains a 
minimal localization of the perceiving subject. For Nishida one could not unambig-
uously claim which side of the body-world binary they are seeing from, as part of the 
event of  vision, whereas for Merleau-Ponty “I am always on the same side of my own 
body.”40 For Nishida one is fully penetrating and penetrated by the visual world, 
whereas for Merleau-Ponty one must be “penetrated by the universe, and not want to 
penetrate it.”41 As Brook Ziporyn points out, these limitations impede full “reversibil-
ity of reversibility,”42 and therefore a subtle prioritization of the subject of vision re-
mains in Merleau-Ponty’s thought. In conceiving of vision as “seeing without a seer,” 
Nishida takes this extra step toward a fully reversible form of visual reversibility.
II. Motor-Perceptual Negation: Multi-Volitional
If we understand the body’s perceptual intertwinement with the object as perceptual 
negation, then, when considering how the moving body intertwines with the moving 
world, we can explore the possibility of a motor-perceptual negation. Progressing to 
motor-perceptual negation does not require an enormous conceptual leap, since, as 
is well known, both Merleau-Ponty and Nishida consider motion and perception as 
two aspects of a single body-world phenomenon. To move is to perceive, and to 
 perceive is to move. When discussing perception above, we were already implicitly 
talking about an aspect of motion. As Nishida writes, in Fundamental Problems of 
Philosophy (Tetsugaku no kompon mondai) (1933): “We act through seeing, and we 
see through acting. . . . Indeed, artistic creativity is a kind of action in such a sense.”43 
Earlier, in Art and Morality (Geijutsu to dōtuko) (1923), he claims that “The artist sees 
through a fusion of eye and hand.”44 In “Eye and Mind” (“L’oeil et l’esprit”), on the 
other hand, Merleau-Ponty writes: “The visible world and the world of my motor 
projects are both total parts of the same Being.”45 By including motion, we can now 
advance from perceptual negation to motor-perceptual negation.
When considering motion in a positivist sense — whether materialist, physiolo-
gist, or physicalist — the motivating factor could be variously understood to be the 
intellect, will, desire, volition, or a combination thereof, but any of these assump-
tions would most likely presuppose that whatever that motivating faculty might be it 
is housed inside the body, not in the world external to it. Yet, as we begin integrating 
negation into an account of motion, upholding a strict distinction between the inside 
and outside of the moving-perceiving body becomes increasingly untenable. The two 
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philosophers suggest that the artist feels movement in the external world as though it 
were part of her body. The early Nishida writes, “to know the change of an external 
thing through one’s vision is the same as feeling the movement of one’s own body 
through muscular sensation. Hence the ‘external world’ refers both to our bodies and 
to other material things.”46 Françoise dastur puts this connection forth in relation to 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept “perceptual faith”:
The experience of the flesh, therefore, is able to take place only on the terrain of percep-
tual faith, which is also that of vision in action, the place where perceiving and per-
ceived are still undivided and where things are experienced as annexes or extensions of 
ourselves.47
Things are felt as annexes of our bodies not only because our perception arises in 
them, but because our perceptual ecstasis includes motion ecstasis. Inseparable from 
vision, our bodily movements are intertwined with the motions of the world around 
us. Nishida’s “unity of act and act” (作用と作用との直接の內面的結合)48 and what 
Merleau-Ponty refers to as a “distant will”49 describe motion as such, and offer a 
more expansive account of the body by construing its movements according to a 
mutual negation between body and world. Rather than being centralized in the 
 human body, motion, like vision, is dispersed throughout the motor-perceptual 
 fabric. In this framework, just as vision becomes multi-perspectival, motion might 
be considered to become multi-volitional, with the source of motion sustaining an 
ambiguity between body and world. While this account receives more textual sup-
port in Nishida’s philosophy, I explore how it is also implicit in Merleau-Ponty’s 
reading of cézanne’s practice as a painter and artist.
“Unity of Act and Act,” and “Distant Will”
Many of our assumptions about motion posit the existence of an active subject 
over against an objective world of non-volitional passive matter. Nishida and 
 Merleau-Ponty reject these positivist assumptions, and go beyond the active-passive 
dichotomy, as well as the notion of a non-volitional entity. The world, Nishida writes, 
is animated by “volitional objects” (ishitaishō 意志対象).50 Foreshadowing the com-
ing discussion of artistic expression, Merleau-Ponty likewise conceives of objects — in 
this case the landscape — as a volitional entity. He writes in “cézanne’s doubt” that 
the artist’s hand was not controlled exclusively by his own volition but was the 
 “instrument of a distant will.”51 Far from inert matter or passive objectivity, Mont 
Sainte-Victoire — the mountain in Aix-en-Provence that was the subject of years of 
observation by cézanne — has a means of acting on the motor-perceptual body of the 
artist.
The artist must conform to objectivity, yet objectivity is not, as we might expect, 
motionless matter, nor is it characterized primarily by extension. The primary charac-
teristic of objects, Nishida stresses numerous times, is not matter or extension but 
activity (sayō).52 For Nishida, the world is not made up of discreet acting subjects 
here and non-acting objects over there, but is an “infinite continuity of acts.”53 When 
painting is considered accordingly, “both the artist and his work become one insep-
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arable act.”54 Nishida’s understanding of motion is not, therefore, a discontinuity of 
an acting subject and passive object, but what he calls, in his early work Art and 
Morality, a “unity of act and act.” Just as the absolute subject cannot encounter 
a  perceptual object, he argues that “there is no action if there is merely one individ-
ual.”55 We are not active as self-contained volitional individuals against a motor- 
neutral world; “we are active bodily,” Nishida contends, “as the world’s own 
self-transformations.”56
Nishida wants to show how motion occurs without an absolute, substantive 
 subject of action, and believes that the artist’s gestures are particularly good at exhib-
iting this. In Fundamental Problems of Philosophy he writes:
Artistic intuition must be an infinite activity. In artistic creativity we neither structure 
things conceptually nor imitate things merely passively. Things beckon and move us. 
Things become the self and vice versa. Moreover, it is an infinite process of self- 
determination as the activity of the oneness of subject and object. Artistic creativity is 
never finished.57
The human body no doubt has a principle of motion that appears to be internal to 
itself, though motion never arises exclusively from inside the body. Motion and even 
stillness are actions at the intersection of a body and the world. They are actions as 
movements constituting a living motor-perceptual fabric. The initiation of motion is 
therefore ambiguous regarding an internal or external locus.
In one of his earliest writings, Merleau-Ponty also highlights how objects and the 
world elicit the body’s motion. He writes:
The task to be performed elicits the necessary movements from him by a sort of remote 
attraction, as the phenomenal forces at work in my visual field elicit from me, without any 
calculation on my part, the motor reactions which establish the most effective balance 
between them, or as the conventions of our social group, or our set of listeners, immedi-
ately elicit from us the words, attitudes and tone which are fitting. . . . [W]e are literally 
what others think of us and what our world is.58
Our continuity of discontinuity with the world is not only perceptual: because per-
ception and motion are in an ambiguous state of mutual determination and revers-
ibility, we also feel the motion of perceptual objects as though our bodily motion 
were implicated. Vision and motion extend into the perceptual field and inhabit its 
volitional objects, just as the field extends into the body’s motor-perceptual negation, 
which is its openness for the world.
III. Faith as “Interexpression”
Nishida and Merleau-Ponty put forth their concepts in different idioms, yet faith, in 
both of their accounts — whether it is in the expression of the artist or the religious 
individual — is faith in the negative. Nishida describes the relation between mutually 
negated bodies as “interexpression.”59 In one of his last writings, “The Logic of the 
Place of Nothingness and the Religious Worldview” (“Bashoteki ronri to shūkyōteki 
sekaikan”) (1945), he develops his mature ontology while elaborating a notion of 
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God, or what he variously refers to as the “Absolute” or “Buddha.” Nishida does 
employ Western religious terminology, but his use of the term “God” can in no way 
be understood as referring to a transcendent, anthropomorphic deity in a Western, 
Judeo-christian sense. Even though various religious traditions understand the 
 relation between God and humans as involving negation, they do not go as far as 
Nishida does. In christian negative theology (Deus Absconditus; Deus Otiosus) and 
in mystical and apophatic traditions across East and West, negation is understood 
as a uni-directional and non-ambiguous relation: God’s expression is achieved by 
negating himself in order that the world and humans can be, but there is no reci-
procity where humans negate so that God can be. God maintains the metaphysical 
laws, but he remains an exception to the laws governing what he creates. As such, 
negation is not a general ontological principle but only a principle of transcendence, 
which renders expression a one-way metaphysical determination.
Nishida’s understanding of the relation of God to humans, however, fully ontol-
ogizes negation by conceiving of the relation as a two-way mutual negation, which 
he characterizes as “interexpression.” “The relation between God and mankind,” 
writes Nishida,
is a relation of interexpression. The absolute does not destroy the relative; it possesses 
 itself and sees itself in its own absolute self-negation. That which stands in relation to the 
absolute as its self-negation must itself be self-expressive through its own self-negation.60
The second sentence makes clear that it is not only God that negates so that humans 
can be, but humans themselves negate in order that God can be. As david dilworth 
explains regarding Nishida, religion has a “transpositional structure: the self- negation 
of the self and the self-negation of the divine, in that matrix of mutual encounter 
called ‘faith’ or ‘enlightenment.’”61 Nishida discusses “God” in the context of his 
notion of “reverse” or “inverse polarity”62 ( gyakutaiō 逆対応). Humans and God are 
in a chiasmatic relation of mutual negation such that one interpenetrates the other. 
“The self exists in a relation of inverse polarity with the absolute,” writes Nishida. He 
 continues, claiming that in what he calls the “paradox of God” there is a “face-to-
face relation with the absolute in a dialectic of mutual presence and absence.”63 In 
this framework negation is a fully ontological principle.
For Nishida, God is not an anthropomorphic being standing outside the material 
realm requiring a two-tier metaphysical trick to explain how he interacts with the 
world. God is not transcendent as opposed to immanent, otherworldly as opposed to 
this-worldly, but is the aspect of reality that unifies these dualities through negation. 
From Nishida’s early philosophy, God is not considered primarily to be a being but 
an activity:
. . . independent, self-fulfilled, infinite activity. We call the base of this infinite activity 
God. God is not something that transcends reality, God is the base of reality. God is that 
which dissolves the distinction between subjectivity and objectivity and unites spirit and 
nature.64
Envisioned this way, religious faith is not belief in a deity or religious dogma. For 
Nishida, faith is the practice of acting beyond the separations between self and world, 
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activity and passivity, subject and object, immanence and transcendence. This is 
achieved by allowing mutual negation to obtain between God and oneself, where 
I express God through my body, and he expresses me though his, that is, through the 
world. In the most basic sense, for Nishida the practice of religious faith is the prac-
tice of overcoming duality. “The dynamics of religious conversion,” he writes, “entail 
the reciprocal, but nondual, intentionality of God and the individual soul. ‘Faith’ and 
‘grace’ are names for this dimension of mutual, and transpositional, revealment.”65
At this point, the connection in Nishida’s philosophy between religious faith and 
his understanding of expression is made clear. Expression is not the simple affir-
mation of the self over against the world or God. Expression as “interexpression” is 
having faith to be negated while negating God: “The relation between God and 
 mankind is always to be understood as dynamically interexpressive based on the 
principle of self-negation.”66 In adopting the terminology of Western religion and 
interpreting it through his Eastern tradition, Nishida shows how all reality is a locus 
for the exercise of interexpressive faith. In so doing he secularizes the spiritual termi-
nology he appropriates, and also gives us an exciting opportunity for comparison 
with Merleau-Ponty’s notions of faith and expression.
Nishida: “Making-Made”
A philosophy that embraces negation challenges the idea that expression is a strictly 
human activity. Even the word “expression,” as derived from exprimere, the Latin 
word meaning the “action of pressing out,” is not an appropriate term because it is 
positivist in at least two senses. First, it implies an internal-external binary where 
the expressive being has something within — an idea, an artistic impulse, or desire — 
which she then presses outward onto an external medium. Second, an active-passive 
 dichotomy is upheld where expressive motion is explained only by the active 
 human agent, while the material receiving the expression is thought to be a passive 
medium receiving but not implicated in the impression making. contrary to this, 
when negation is taken into account — as I argue is the case with both Nishida 
and Merleau-Ponty — expression is ambiguous regarding internality-externality and 
activity-passivity, and is a multi-directional event between body and world.
The artist can no longer be thought of as a lone agent introducing expression into 
a passive world of non-expressive matter. Expression is always interexpression and as 
such has the structure Nishida refers to in his 1938 essay “Human Being” as “from 
the made to the making” (tsukuraretamono kara tsukurumono e).67 Nishida writes 
that interexpression “must be a productive transaction; and so in productivity subjec-
tivity becomes objectivity and makes things, and at the same time that which is made 
makes that which makes. It is one transactional process.”68 This making-made struc-
ture, made prominent in Nishida’s mature writings, is the key to going beyond a 
positivist notion of expression.
Religious expression is not solely the human act of opening up to the divine: 
“This opening,” Nishida’s translator dilworth writes, is a “mutual opening — a 
co-originative event.”69 For one to be “religiously volitional” is, then, to “open him-
self up to the working of God or Buddha within himself.”70 Religious faith is such 
a co-originative event and, like artistic expression, has the ambiguous structure of 
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making while being made: Both the believer and the believed arise as two aspects of 
the same expressive act. Quoting Nishida to this effect, dilworth elaborates:
The religiously active individual therefore encounters God or Buddha in the intimately 
personal dimension of interexpression through mutual affirmation and negation. “The self 
faces the absolute at the limit point of its own individual will. God, too, faces the self in 
his absolute will.” Active religious expression must be ec-static — a leap of faith in that 
existential dimension wherein the act is the contradictory identity of transcendent and 
immanent planes of self-awareness. The act always has the paradoxical form of active 
intuition.71
consequently, expression is not a one-way positive determination, whether from 
God to humans or from the artist to the world. Expression is an event of the 
 motor-perceptual world in which the artist engages and co-creates. Nishida writes 
that “the relation between that which is self-expressive, and that which is expressed 
and hence made expressive must be grasped as a dynamic interexpression.”72
Explaining this concept in reference to Leibniz, Nishida elaborates the mutual 
negation underlying both in the following words:
The humanly conscious world having this structure of contradictory identity, self- 
consciousness is always interexpressive. . . . In Leibniz’s own terms, each monad 
 expresses the world and simultaneously is an originating point of the world’s own 
 expression.73
The monads are the world’s own perspectives; they form the world interexpressively 
through their own mutual negation and affirmation.74
Although Merleau-Ponty was critical of aspects of Leibniz’ philosophy in his early 
work,75 his later understanding of expression is, like Nishida’s, conceived along the 
lines of monadological expression. Leibniz’ monads, Merleau-Ponty writes, are in 
a “relation of reciprocal expression of the perspectives taken on the world.”76 
 Merleau-Ponty’s understanding of expression, like Nishida’s “interexpression,” is 
a reciprocal body-world relation. Yet, unlike Nishida, who understands this rela-
tion as obtaining through mutual negation, Merleau-Ponty remains critical of the 
monadology for remaining within substantialism and ontotheological positivism.77
“Expressing-Expressed”: Sacramentalizing the Secular and Secularizing the Sacred
In a recent work, donald Landes frames Merleau-Ponty’s theory of expression as 
“expressing-expressed,” thereby hinting at similarities with Nishida’s making-made 
structure.78 As it is with Nishida, in Merleau-Ponty’s view negation gives multi- 
perspectival/volitional motor-perception, thus expanding the account of expression. 
Merleau-Ponty arrives at this expansion, as Nishida does, by including the historical 
world in the account of the artist’s motor-perception. He alludes to this historical, 
making-made dimension when he writes, “this is the historicity of the painter at work 
when with a single gesture he links tradition that he carries on and the tradition 
that he founds.”79 The artist takes from and gives to history in each gesture. Similar 
to Nishida’s interexpression as making-made, “every relation with being,” Merleau- 
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Ponty writes, “is simultaneously a taking and a being taken.”80 The artist is not an 
autonomous expressive entity. The artist is he who is able to make his body continu-
ous with the world, through motor-perceptual negation, such that the world’s own 
movements intertwine with his movements and make manifest a “distant will” in his 
body, through his hand, pencil, brush, or chisel.
For Nishida this mutual taking-and-being-taken relation between God and 
 humans is put forth as philosophic-religious experience. While Merleau-Ponty’s 
 expressing-expressed dynamic is not articulated in an explicitly religious idiom, 
Richard Kearney places this aspect of his thought between the sacred and secular 
according to what he calls “sacramental sensation.” Similar to the mutual negation 
in Nishida’s later writings where, through a making-made dynamic, God and hu-
mans give rise to each other, Kearney refers to a birthing-birthed dynamic between 
body and world:
[E]ach sensory encounter with the strangeness of the world is an invitation to a “natal 
pact” where, through “. . . sympathy,” the human self and the strange world give birth to 
one another. Sacramental sensation is a reversible rapport between myself and things, 
wherein the sensible gives birth to itself through me.81
Because it is in the immanent fabric of everyday phenomenal experience that the 
sacrament is available, there is, Kearney writes, a “transformation of the quotidian 
into the sacred.”82 The mutual birthing of body and world is an ontological aspect of 
all experience; therefore all phenomenal reality is transformed into a potential venue 
for what Kearney calls a “eucharistic” act of communion between body and world.
Nishida, I have argued, problematizes the sacred-secular distinction by taking 
religious terminology and bringing it down to earth, while Merleau-Ponty reaches the 
same point from the other way around, by elevating the mundane fabric of everyday 
experience toward the sacred. The body’s openness onto the profane world is the 
primary and highest form of truth, and faith is the practice that achieves this truth.
By promoting faith as “communion” and nonduality with the everyday phenom-
enal world, Merleau-Ponty goes underneath the distinction between secular and 
 religious philosophy, thereby taking one step outside of the Western tradition and 
inching closer to East Asian religious-philosophical orientations, which more readily 
accommodate art and religion within philosophy. Kearney sees the “anatheism” of 
Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy as being achieved by the artist in particular: “Whether 
this mutual transversal of the sacred and secular in art and literature is a matter 
of sacramentalizing the secular or of secularizing the sacred,” Merleau-Ponty’s 
“anatheist” philosophy “may allow it to be both at once. Religion as art and art as 
religion.”83
Faithful Expression: Blind Spot
The faith these philosophers speak of is not an ontic decision. It is the ontological 
dimension of all motion and perception mediated by mutual negation with the world. 
Unlike religious forms of faith, what Merleau-Ponty and Nishida articulate is not a 
kind of faith that one can choose their way in or out of. In his first published work 
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Nishida explains that the faith he speaks of is a “faith we cannot lose,”84 an echo of 
which is found in his much later words:
People often confuse religious faith with subjective belief. . . . [T]hey even consider faith 
to be grounded in the subjective power of the will. I maintain, however, that religious 
faith pertains to something objective, some absolute fact of the self. . . . Religious faith 
involves precisely this dimension wherein the self discovers itself as bottomlessly contra-
dictory identity.85
This can be compared with Merleau-Ponty’s view in Sense and Non-Sense (Sens et 
Non-Sens) (1948). Merleau-Ponty does not say that faith is our belief or decision, but 
instead “each of our perceptions is an act of faith in that it affirms more than we 
strictly know, since objects are inexhaustible and our information limited.”86
If there is no position outside the motor-perceptual fabric, and therefore no way 
to choose one’s way out of body-world negation, we might ask why are some people 
better at faithful expression? If faith is a fact of our being continuously discontinu-
ous with the world, can we augment or modify faith? cézanne is an exemplar for 
Merleau-Ponty in this regard because through his artistic experiments he was able to 
move and perceive out of a significantly elevated sense of continuity with the world 
he sought to depict. If he had a different understanding of his body’s relation to the 
landscape, this might have made a crucial difference with respect to how he moved 
as part of that world. Had cézanne believed implicitly that his body was motor- 
perceptually distinct from the landscape, he might not have meditated so attentively 
on it for hours seeking to gear his motion and perception into Mont Sainte-Victoire’s, 
which might have rendered the mountain on canvas quite differently.
The question of how one can be faithfully oriented within the motor-perceptual 
world is complicated by the limits to motion and perception. To be co-participant in 
the world, as an artist or otherwise, is to immerse oneself within the negative, the 
invisible, and the passive. Because we are in a “natal pact” with the world, woven 
into its fabric, one can never have a detached outside view of the whole. As such, 
vision is never complete. Vision is limited by what Merleau-Ponty refers to as a “blind 
spot.” This blind spot can be misinterpreted easily if we understand it in a positivist 
or representational sense. In The Visible and the Invisible, Merleau-Ponty explains 
how invisibility cannot be “treat[ed] as a simple state of non-vision,”87 but is essen-
tial to the coming into being of the visible. He elaborates: “To this structure is bound 
the ambiguity of the consciousness, and even a sort of blindness of the conscious-
ness, of imperception in perception — To see is to not see.”88 The significance of 
this blind spot and its ambiguity is not limited to vision: this physiological fact is 
an aspect of the more fundamental ontological principle of mutual negation that 
determines all of the body’s relations to being. As Merleau-Ponty explains, “What 
it does not see is what makes it see, is its tie to Being, is its corporeity, are the 
 existentials by which the world becomes visible, is the flesh wherein the object 
is born.”89
The blind spot is not a circumscribed area here or there, which cannot be seen, 
such as the blind spot of a car from which no visual data is received. Visibility does 
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not manifest in one place and invisibility in another: the visible is “lined” with the 
invisible and therefore the blind spot in the deepest sense of the word cannot be 
eliminated. There is a dynamic element to the blind spot in Merleau-Ponty’s view. 
When one tries to move into a different vantage point to remove it to see what was 
previously invisible, it changes as the world shifts from background to figure, from 
invisible to visible. It would be as if one were attempting to accurately measure the 
surface topography of water while being immersed in it. All movements aimed at 
measuring would be self-defeating because the attempt to assess the topography 
changes it, because the topography contains everything, including the movements 
that attempt to measure it. Only a position exterior to the motor-perceptual fabric 
could successfully make any such exhaustive measurement, but such a motor-neutral 
position is a fiction. The blind spot, and more generally the limitation on motor per-
ception, maintains itself by virtue of the body being woven into the motor-perceptual 
fabric through mutual negation.
This blind spot limits not only vision: it is not only a perceptual blind spot but is 
more generally a motor-perceptual blind spot. This is an element of all movement 
that is beyond one’s control. As discussed above, in the case of perception, a blind 
spot is maintained because the visible is constituted as lined by the invisible. Action 
is also lined by its opposite, in this case, passivity. Through the passive constituent of 
its activity, the body receives and enacts the solicitations of the world, receives and 
carries forth the historically sedimented ways of moving and doing things, without 
noticing or choosing to do so. In this sense, the body is not only intertwined with the 
world in perceptual ecstasis; it is also in a form of motion ecstasis. To be so oriented 
within the world is not to choose a certain movement: it is prior to any choice. It is 
the structure of the relationship between a motor-perceptual body and the world. The 
motion blind spot is a constitutive element of this intertwining, and therefore cannot 
be eliminated. We might be able to minimize the blind spot if we were active at one 
time and passive at another, yet just as we cannot parse the aspect of the visible field 
that is invisible, we cannot isolate the passive aspect of our motions, nor can we 
separate away the part that comes from our own body from the part solicited by 
 objects and the world. All movement is ambiguously constituted through intertwined 
layers of activity and passivity, making and being made. All movement proceeds in 
tacit coordination with the blind spot; therefore all movement is partially out of 
one’s control and proceeds with a constitutive form of risk. This motor risk will be 
discussed in the upcoming section, which will further establish the necessity of a 
motor-perceptual form of faith.
Expression and Infinity
If Nishida and Merleau-Ponty rightly identify a constitutive limit to motion and  vision, 
one might expect that they would depict artists who acknowledge such limits by 
constraining the body’s expressive practices. Quite to the contrary, however, both 
conceive of artistic activity as infinite. In a footnote from his Intuition and Reflection 
in Self-Consciousness ( Jikaku ni okeru chokkan to hansei) (1917) Nishida quotes 
conrad Fiedler, who writes that “there is an infinity which has nothing to do with 
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the realm of thought, and which reveals itself purely as an infinity of the visible 
world.”90 It is not the philosopher: “Only the artist and those who can follow him 
stand before this infinity.”91 “Artistic intuition,” in Nishida’s account, “must be an 
infinite activity.”92 Merleau-Ponty also conceives of artistic expression as engaging 
an infinite world. According to what he called an “infinite logos,” he writes that 
“each brushstroke must satisfy an infinite number of conditions,” and, quoting Emile 
Bernard, suggests that each of these strokes must “contain the air, the light, the 
 object, the composition, the character, the outline, and the style. Expressing what 
exists is an endless task.”93
How can a single brushstroke, which we commonly think of as only correspond-
ing to a small portion of a painting, contain the whole? A painting would never begin 
if the artist had to grasp all of the features of a landscape or a face. Nevertheless, for 
Nishida, “each of the artist’s exquisite brush strokes expresses the true meaning of the 
whole.”94 compare this with cézanne as captured in Merleau-Ponty’s words:
If the painter is to express the world, the arrangement of his colors must bear within this 
indivisible whole, or else his painting will only hint at things and will not give them in the 
imperious unity, the presence, the insurpassable plenitude which is for us the definition 
of the real.95
Infinite magnitudes cannot be calculated by the reflective intellect. The artist’s 
 motions would never be “rapid and precise enough if they had to be based upon 
an actual calculation of effects.”96 The infinite cannot be reckoned with through 
 calculation, and therefore presents a constraint on the intellect. “It is not that faith is 
supported by knowledge and the will, but that knowledge and the will are supported 
by faith,” writes Nishida in his earliest monograph, where he further explains that “If 
we exhaust our intellect and will, then we will acquire from within a faith we cannot 
lose.”97 When speaking of “independent, self-sufficient true reality,” which he con-
strues as infinite, Nishida urges us to see that we “must realize the true state of this 
reality with our entire being rather than reflect on it, analyze it, or express it in 
words.”98 Similarly, Merleau-Ponty affirms that “we will miss the relationship — which 
we shall here call the openness upon the world (ourverture au monde) — the moment 
that the reflective effort tries to capture it.”99
contemplating Matisse’s practice, which was captured on film in slow motion, 
Merleau-Ponty writes that with a “simple gesture he resolved the problem which in 
retrospect seemed to imply an infinite number of data.”100 While the reflective intel-
lect cannot perform such calculations, Merleau-Ponty believes that the body is able 
to engage with the infinite in its most “simple gestures.” At this point we can see a 
further necessity of a motor-perceptual form of faith. The visible is infinite because it 
includes not only the countless positive elements, but because it is also comprised of 
the negative, invisible, and unseen. One must have faith in these aspects because 
reflecting on them unintentionally changes them from negative to positive, from the 
invisible to the visible, and therefore reflection “renders impossible that openness 
upon being which is the perceptual faith,”101 writes Merleau-Ponty. There must be an 
orientation within the motor-perceptual fabric that risks expression while acknowl-
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edging the negative constituents, the invisible, and the passive without converting 
them into the visible and active. doing so is not simply to be continuous with an 
infinite visible world; there are likewise an incalculable set of volitional loci eliciting 
one’s motions from within the field of experience. The artist cannot reflect on the 
entirety of the solicitations that move her body, because each movement is part of 
an infinite continuity of interconnected acts. Nonetheless, when one risks putting 
reflection aside, Nishida argues that “the act of pure visual perception naturally 
moves our body and develops into a kind of expressive movement. This is the cre-
ative act of the artist.”102 The artist is the exemplar for Nishida because it is he who 
finds a way for the world to move the body without completely relinquishing himself 
to passivity. By risking being moved as such, he claims, “the prospect of a world of 
infinite visual perception opens up.”103
Attempting such expressive movements in response to the world’s infinite de-
mand, and acting without prioritizing intellectual reflection, or importing a prefabri-
cated representation of how the movement of a brushstroke will manifest, is a risk 
that necessitates motor-perceptual faith. This type of expression is not possible when 
one attempts to act purely based on reflective control or one’s independent volition. 
Appropriate expression is possible when one moves their body with a faith that 
 allows for a silent negotiation with the world. The artist must have faith that her ac-
tions will arise from an intertwinement with an invisible worldly expressive agent. 
Quoting Paul Klee, Merleau-Ponty writes that this agent is a “distant will”: “working 
its way along the hand’s conductor, it reaches the canvas and invades it.”104 “There 
is no break at all in this circuit,”105 writes Merleau-Ponty. cézanne’s is an exemplar 
of this kind of expressive practice because he has faith that allows Mont Sainte- 
Victoire to intertwine with his body such that his expression is a multi-stable attune-
ment between making and being made, expressing and being expressed. While he 
doubts, cézanne nevertheless has faith that infinite artistic gesture can arise through 
motor-perceptual negation with the intrinsically volitional world.
IV. Conclusion: Cézanne’s Faith as “Interexpression”
Nishida and Merleau-Ponty focus on spontaneity to explore the motor-perceptual 
risk of expressive activity. In Art and Morality Nishida writes that “when the artist is 
thoroughly immersed in the horizon of pure visual perception, he spontaneously 
moves the organs of his whole body and becomes one expressive movement. At this 
time . . . the artist himself cannot foretell the direction and meaning of his own 
 expressive act.”106 To express oneself without this foreknowledge, Merleau-Ponty 
also believes, is to risk one’s gestures and to have faith that in “lending his body to 
the world” the painter “changes the world into paintings.”107
If movements could be entirely controlled by one’s reflective intellect, then one 
could at least consider the possibility of being in full control of one’s gestures, and 
could attempt to foretell how they would transpire. However, when artists allow their 
gestures to arise at the intertwinement of body and world, activity and passivity, the 
work is only made visible as it is enacted. In this mode of interexpression, Nishida 
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writes, “the artist himself does not know what his creation will be. In such an in-
stance he sees through action.”108 Similarly for Merleau-Ponty, this form of expres-
sion requires faith insofar as one must risk entering the expressive movement without 
full bodily control and without a pre-made representation of the outcome. Because 
“conception cannot precede execution,” Merleau-Ponty writes, “before expression, 
there is nothing but a vague fever, and only the work itself, completed and under-
stood, will prove that there was something rather than nothing to be found there.”109
To achieve continuity with the world — as is the goal of Nishida’s form of faith as 
interexpression — strictly human-centered expression would be too impoverished 
and could not possibly perform the infinite calculus. Artworks such as cézanne’s are 
the result of an intertwining of body and world and thereupon make the world visible 
in the way only great works can. This is an infinite task not available to artists who 
believe that they work as expressive agents independent of the world. conversely, 
making expressive movements in response to the world’s infinite demand and acting 
without reflection, without importing a prefabricated representation of how gesture 
and brushstroke will manifest, is a risk because the body’s motor-perceptual negation 
with the world, together with the blind spot, makes all movements exceed one’s 
control. To lend one’s body to the world to meet this infinite demand requires faith, 
at once motor and perceptual, where the artist becomes both an expressor of the 
world and the thing expressed by that world.
To be precise, Merleau-Ponty had not yet come to develop his concept of faith in 
the period when cézanne was occupying his thinking and writing. Nevertheless, we 
can now read his interpretation of the artist’s practice as prefiguring the concept of 
“perceptual faith” and in so doing extend the dialogue with Nishida by way of his 
concept of “interexpression.” Merleau-Ponty focused closely on the intricacies of 
cézanne’s practice because his experiments not only disclosed the motor-perceptual 
body he wanted to bring to our attention, but also revealed a landscape implicating 
itself through the artist’s motion and perception. Insofar as cézanne’s actions geared 
into those of the landscape, each of his gestures enacted a motor-perceptual form of 
faith. As such, his expression allowed for a transfer of the landscape’s expressive 
motions into his gestures. While painting, cézanne was thus giving to and taking 
from the landscape in a way similar to the interexpressive orientation of making 
while being made that Nishida highlights in his mature writings.
Merleau-Ponty explains how cézanne would sit and meditate in intense concen-
tration on the landscape for hours, not moving an inch, only looking. When his 
movements arose it was not that cézanne had finally filled himself with enough 
 accurate landscape representations that he could then properly mimic, but that he 
had achieved a motor-perceptual form of non-selfhood that allowed the landscape’s 
motions available through its non-objecthood to manifest in his body through nega-
tion. As such, it is not only cézanne that sees Mont Sainte-Victoire but “it is the 
mountain itself which from out there makes itself seen by the painter.”110 Within 
such ambiguities, the artist and his movements are seen in a drastically different light 
than according to a positivist understanding of expression. cézanne exhibits how a 
particular kind of artistic expression cannot be conceived of as originating  exclusively 
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in a self-identical active subject. The artist does not simply act while the mountain 
remains motionless. Both mountain and painter are acts, and expression is what 
Nishida calls a “unity of act and act.” As he writes a decade later in Fundamental 
Problems, “Artistic intuition must be an infinite activity. . . . Things beckon and move 
us. Things become the self and vice versa.”111
Expression is not exclusively a human event. When cézanne achieves the proper 
motor-perceptual attunement with the world through a lively vision, that vision is no 
longer distinct from the action that paints the landscape. The light reaching the eyes 
includes a motor demand that invades the body, filling not just a perceptual negation 
but also a motor-perceptual negation. Expression arises as an attunement between 
body and world, paintbrush and landscape. Artistic movement is the unity of the 
acts of what Nishida calls the “historical body” (rekishiteki shintai 歴史的身体) and 
the acts of the “historical world” (rekishiteki sekai 歴史的世界). cézanne is not free 
or in full control of his gestures. The artist cannot simply paint what he wants. As 
 Merleau-Ponty writes, “cézanne simply released that meaning: it was the objects 
and the faces themselves as he saw them that demanded to be painted, and cézanne 
simply expressed what they wanted to say.”112 The artist is not the only expressive 
unit: she is the expressor but is equally the thing being expressed. For Merleau-Ponty 
this is so to the extent that it is “impossible to distinguish between who sees and who 
is seen, who paints and what is painted.”113 In Nishida’s words, “the artist and his 
work become one inseparable act.”114 In a later essay “The Historical Body,” he 
 further elaborates:
An art work combines both — the subjective activity and objective result. It is not that the 
artist just acts subjectively; rather, from the objective side, he is also acted upon by the 
thing. If one speaks of an opposition of subject and object, the artist acts out of his 
 subjectivity and at the same time he is acted upon from the side of the object. The artwork 
is realized from a mutual interaction — or reciprocal transaction — of subjectivity and 
 objectivity.115
Painting, as cézanne practiced it, achieves a similar ambiguity between subjec-
tivity and objectivity. The subjective desires of the artist are not the only thing moti-
vating how a painting will turn out. “Motivating all the movements from which a 
picture gradually emerges,” writes Merleau-Ponty, “there can be only one thing: the 
landscape in its totality and in its absolute fullness.”116 The world is therefore not a 
passive object for an active subject’s artistic expression. Artists are not completely 
free to choose how the world will come to presence through their expressive ges-
tures. They must risk engaging in an interexpressive relation where their work is 
co-authored with a much larger and invisible motor-perceptual agent. The world 
places demands on the painter’s body and, Merleau-Ponty writes, “is capable of de-
manding that color and that object in preference to all others, and since it commands 
the arrangement of a painting just as imperiously as a syntax or a logic.”117 The 
world’s demand is enacted through the aspect of the artist’s body opened by way of 
motor-perceptual negation. Risking one’s body to meet this demand through interex-
pression is an act of motor-perceptual faith.
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world,” and “primary/primordial belief,” while also referring to the body’s 
“preconscious possession of the world,” and “primary comprehension,” which 
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tionality” when considering neurological pathologies of motion and per-
ception, as interpreted through Gestalt psychology. In his Phenomenology of 
Perception he writes that “every perceptual habituality is still a motor habit” 
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as he explores the “chiasm” and “intertwining” of the visual and the tactile. 
Nishida employs various terms throughout his writings when referring to the 
ambiguity of motion and perception. In An Inquiry into the Good, his concept 
of “movement representations” (Kitarō Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, 
trans. Masao Abe and christopher Ives [New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1992], p. 24) and his later concept of “acting intuition” (kōiteki chokkan 
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explored in Nishida Kitarō, Art and Morality, trans. david A. dilworth and 
Valdo H. Viglielmo (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 1973), p. 25, as 
“muscular perception,” and in his From the Acting to the Seeing (Hataraku 
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beyond the distinction between subject and object. As both philosophers 
move toward their later writings — Nishida developing his Logic of Place 
(Basho no ronri 場所の論理) and Merleau-Ponty his ontology of flesh (chair) — 
both expand beyond an ambiguity between the body’s motion and perception 
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motor-perceptual.
3   –   Nishida Kitarō, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy: The World of Action 
and the Dialectical World, trans. david A. dilworth (Tokyo: Sophia University 
Press, 1970), p. 1.
4   –   While Nishida uses this term mostly regarding time, Krummel and Nagatomo 
read it more broadly as a general ontological principle arrived at through 
self-negation. They write: “self-negation ( jiko hitei), which [Nishida] also 
 considers a “continuity of discontinuity” (hirenzoku no renzoku). We find 
that this dialectic [of self-negation] involves a chiasma of vertical and hori-
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environment, person-person, subject-object, etc.” (Place and Dialectic: Two 
Essays by Nishida Kitarō, trans. John W. M. Krummel and Shigenori Nagatomo 
[New York: Oxford University Press, 2012], p. 47).
5   –   Several commentators, such as John W. M. Krummel (Nishida Kitarō’s Chias-
matic Chorology: Place of Dialectic, Dialectic of Place [Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2015]); Krummel and Nagatomo (Place and Dialectic); 
Nobuo Kazashi (“Bodily Logos: James, Merleau-Ponty, and Nishida,” in 
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Exteriority, Psychic Life and the World [Albany: State University of New York 
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 Kitarō’s Chiasmatic Chorology). There is a terminological difficulty with com-
paring Nishida on this point, because he uses the terms zettai hitei 絶対否定 
and zettai no hitei 絶対の否定 — both translated as “absolute negation” — which 
would seem to fall prey to Merleau-Ponty’s critique of Sartre. Yet, as Gereon 
Kopf points out, Nishida’s is an “idiosyncratic notion of zettai ” (“Is dialectical 
Philosophy Tenable? Revisiting Hegel, Nishida, and Takahashi,” International 
Journal for Field-Being 3, no. 1 [2006]). Unlike Sartre’s absolute negation, 
Nishida’s zettai hitei is actually a mutual and partial negation. The Japanese 
word for “absolute,” zettai 絶対, is composed of two characters, zetsu 絶 (to 
sever) and tai 対 (opposition). This type of negation has the notion of ambigu-
ity built into its etymology insofar as negation is not pure but carries with it its 
own “severance.”
12   –   Nishida, Place and Dialectic, p. 51.
13   –   Ibid.
14   –   Ibid., p. 47.
15   –   Translation based on Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 65, 
with minor.
16   –   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics 
Reader: Philosophy and Painting, ed. with introd. Galen A. Johnson, transla-
tion editor Michael B. Smith (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993), 
p. 144.
17   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 59.
18   –   Ibid., p. 53.
19   –   Translation based on Nishida, Art and Morality, trans. dilworth, p. 101, with 
minor revisions.
20   –   The term Merleau-Ponty uses is doublure, which has the sense of a “dou-
bling,” where one material lines another, such as how wallpaper lines a wall, 
or silk lines the inside of a suit (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” in 
Johnson and Smith, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, p. 147). He also 
uses doublure when speaking of ideas “lining” the sensible (The Visible and 
the Invisible, p. 149). In other sections, when speaking of how our flesh 
 envelops visible and tangible things, what is translated into English as “lining” 
is tapiss in French (The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 123, 137).
21   –   Nishida Kitarō, Ishiki no mondai (The Problem of Consciousness), in Nishida 
Kitarō Zenshū, 3rd ed. (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1978–) (hereafter abbreviated 
NKZ ), vol. 3, p. 212.
22   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 59.
23   –   Ibid.
 Adam Loughnane 733
24   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 125.
25   –   For an elaboration of this similarity in Nishida and Merleau-Ponty see Steve 
Odin, The Social Self in Zen and American Pragmatism (Albany: State Univer-
sity of New York Press, 1996), p. 371.
26   –   NKZ 8 : 328.
27   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 189.
28   –   NKZ 3 : 214. Nishida approaches this issue of interiority and exteriority from 
the standpoint of what he believes to be an invalid distinction between  “direct” 
and “indirect” consciousness, a distinction wrongly indexed to perception 
and memory, respectively. (To draw this contrast, in Ishiki no Mondai Nishida 
uses the term “Indirect for our consciousness” [感覚的意識に直接でない] and 
several instances of contrasting terms such as “direct experience” [直接経験] 
“direct perception” [直接的経験] and “direct consciousness” [直接に意識]). 
He is arguing against the belief that when perceptions are stored in memory 
they cease to be perceptual. Nishida vividly illustrates the perceptual reality of 
memory in his account of the fragrance of the rose: “It is not the case that one 
smells the fragrance and then the past memory of a rose occurs, but in the 
midst of the rose’s fragrance one smells the past memory” (NKZ 3 : 383).
29   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 138.
30   –   Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 80.
31   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 134.
32   –   Ibid., p. 130.
33   –   Ibid.
34   –   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” in Johnson and Smith, The 
 Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, p. 67.
35   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 129.
36   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 35.
37   –   NKZ 3 : 255.
38   –   Nishida, Place and Dialectic, p. 360.
39   –   Lawlor, Leonard, Early Twentieth-century Philosophy, (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 2012), p. 151.
40   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 81.
41   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 129.
42   –   Brook Ziporyn, “How the Tree Sees Me: Sentience and Insentience in Tiantai 
and Merleau-Ponty,” in Park and Kopf, Merleau-Ponty and Buddhism, p. 80.
43   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 193.
734 Philosophy East & West
44   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, p. 206.
45   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 124.
46   –   Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. 24.
47   –   Françoise dastur, “World, Flesh, Vision,” in Chiasms: Merleau-Ponty’s Notion 
of Flesh, ed. Fred Evans and Leonard Lawlor (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 2000), p. 35.
48   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, p. 36.
49   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 147. Merleau-Ponty quotes this term of 
Paul Klee’s from his diary entry # 1104 in Klee. The Diaries of Paul Klee, 
1898–1918 (Berkeley: University of california Press, 1992), p. 387.
50   –   NKZ 3 : 24.
51   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 147.
52   –   NKZ 3 : 118.
53   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, p. 37.
54   –   Ibid., p. 26.
55   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 47.
56   –   Nishida Kitarō, “World as Identity of Absolute contradiction,” in Sourcebook 
for Modern Japanese Philosophy: Selected Documents, ed. david dilworth 
and Valdo Viglielmo, with Agustin Jacinto Zavala (Westport cT: Greenwood 
Press, 1998), p. 58.
57   –   Translation based on Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 179, 
with minor revisions.
58   –   Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 122.
59   –   I use david dilworth’s translation of hyōgenteki kankei 表現的関係 (NKZ 
10 : 347) as “Interexpression.” This translation as well as a more literal, 
 expanded translation (“the mutual relationship between absolutely opposed 
things must be expressive”) would accord with the present article’s overall 
proposition that expression is the encounter of mutually negating entities.
60   –   Nishida Kitarō, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, 
trans. with intro. david A. dilworth (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press), 
p. 103.
61   –   Ibid., p. 37.
62   –   As Heisig contends, this concept is the theological version of Nishida’s 
more basic notion of “self-identity of absolute contradictories” as it applied 
to the relation between humans and God. It is also translated as “counter- 
correspondence” or “inverse-” or “reverse-correlation.”
 Adam Loughnane 735
63   –   Nishida Kitarō, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, 
trans. with introd. david A. dilworth (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press), 
p. 111.
64   –   Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. 79.
65   –   Nishida, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, p. 35.
66   –   Ibid., p. 103.
67   –   Nishida Kitarō, Ontology of Production: Three Essays, trans. with introd. 
 William Haver (durham: duke University Press, 2012), p. 144.
68   –   Nishida Kitarō, “The World as Identity of Absolute contradiction,” in  dilworth, 
Viglielmo, and Zavala, Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy, p. 41.
69   –   Nishida, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, p. 39.
70   –   Ibid., p. 39.
71   –   Ibid.
72   –   Translation based on Nishida, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious 
Worldview, p. 104, with minor revisions.
73   –   Ibid., p. 53.
74   –   Ibid., p. 58.
75   –   In his Phenomenology of Perception Merleau-Ponty distances himself from 
Leibniz’ conception of subjectivity (p. 374), and later in that work elaborates 
this in terms of monads being tied to a uni-perspectival vantage point that does 
not allow the perceiving subject to change points of view (p. 407).
76   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 222.
77   –   Ibid., p. 223.
78   –   donald A. Landes, Merleau-Ponty and the Paradoxes of Expression (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2013).
79   –   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” in 
Johnson and Smith, The Merleau-Ponty Aesthetics Reader, p. 100. In the 1930s 
Nishida begins conceiving of the body-world relation underlying human ac-
tivity and artistic expression as a relation between what he calls the “historical 
body” (rekishiteki shintai 歴史的身体) and the “historical world” (rekishiteki 
sekai 歴史的世界). Expressive activity is not the “making” of an active artist 
over against a static “made” material world but is a dynamic and temporal 
“making-made” interaction between an expressive body and an expressive 
world. This world is not, however, a transcendent realm fully determining the 
individual. As what Nishida calls a “dialectical universal” comes into play, it 
both conditions and is conditioned by human activity, and develops “from the 
created to the creating.” As James Heisig writes, the relationship between the 
historical body and historical world “works in two directions. . . . [T]he body 
736 Philosophy East & West
gives concreteness to historical life, and . . . the historical world gives the body 
an arena in which to work” ( James W. Heisig, Philosophers of Nothingness: 
An Essay on the Kyoto School [Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 2001], 
p. 69).
80   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 6.
81   –   Richard Kearney, Anatheism: Returning to God after God (New York: colum-
bia University Press, 2011), p. 89.
82   –   Richard Kearney, “Merleau-Ponty and the Sacramentality of the Flesh,” in 
Kascha Semonovitch and Neal deRoo, eds., Merleau-Ponty at the Limits of 
Art, Religion, and Perception (London: Bloomsbury, 2010), p. 153.
83   –   Ibid., p. 102.
84   –   Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. 157.
85   –   Nishida, Last Writings: Nothingness and the Religious Worldview, p. 85.
86   –   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Sense and Non-Sense, trans. with an introd. Hubert 
L. dreyfus and Patricia Allen dreyfus (Evanston: Northwestern University 
Press, 1964), p. 179; emphasis added.
87   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 33.
88   –   Ibid., p. 225.
89   –   Ibid., p. 248.
90   –   Nishida Kitarō, Intuition and Reflection in Self-Consciousness, trans. Valdo 
Viglielmo with Takeuchi Yoshinori and Joseph S. O’Leary (Albany: State Uni-
versity of New York Press, 1987), p. 186.
91   –   Ibid.
92   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 179.
93   –   Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” p. 65.
94   –   Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. 33.
95   –   Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” p. 65.
96   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” p. 103.
97   –   Nishida, An Inquiry into the Good, p. 157.
98   –   Ibid., p. 51.
99   –   Maurice Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, pp. 35–36.
100   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” p. 83.
101   –   Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, p. 88.
102   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, p. 24.
103   –   Ibid.
 Adam Loughnane 737
104   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 147.
105   –   Ibid.
106   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, pp. 48– 49.
107   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 123.
108   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 69.
109   –   Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” p. 69.
110   –   Ibid., p. 128.
111   –   Nishida, Fundamental Problems of Philosophy, p. 179.
112   –   Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” p. 71.
113   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Eye and Mind,” p. 129.
114   –   Nishida, Art and Morality, p. 26.
115   –   Nishida Kitarō, “The Historical Body,” in dilworth, Viglielmo, and Zavala, 
Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy, p. 40.
116   –   Merleau-Ponty, “cézanne’s doubt,” p. 67.
117   –   Merleau-Ponty, “Indirect Language and the Voices of Silence,” p. 92.
